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ABSTRACT 
The locational decisions of firms present a complex economic and political 
problem for State Legislatures across the United States of America. It is well known that 
individual states compete against one another, offering large packages of incentives to 
firms who open within their borders – a process popularly known as the “race to the 
bottom.” This thesis examines public subsidy information reported by the Mississippi 
Development Authority alongside wage and employment data from 1990 to 2016 in a 
local projection framework to examine whether or not treatment effects of local 
government spending are significant. I then employ the same method on targeted 
industries. I find no significant evidence these subsidies have measurable effects on wage 
or employment in Mississippi.     
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1. Introduction  
In the United States, it is common for individual state governments to compete 
against one another to attract businesses within their own borders in the hopes of creating 
jobs and increasing incomes. Typically, states plead their case by dangling amenities at 
potential firms, highlighting their strengths – a favorable political climate, a developing 
industry, brand new infrastructure, or skilled laborers that match-up well with business 
needs from the jump. When these benefits aren’t enough to convince executives, a state 
turns to its next answer: loans, grants, tax rebates, and worker education programs to seal 
the deal. These subsidies may target broad industries and cover thousands of firms, or 
may be customized to fit an individual business at a single location. For the right price, 
anything is possible. Accordingly, this thesis examines the annual incentives awarded to 
businesses located or opening in Mississippi.  
Historically, Mississippi’s agrarian economy suffered major strain after stalled 
attempts to industrialize in the early 20th century resulted in little progress. Two major 
events compounded one another: disastrous flooding of the Mississippi River Valley, in 
1912 and again in 1927, and the introduction of the Boll Weevil pest which combined to 
ravage cotton crops (Soloman, 1999). These two events displaced sharecropping African 
Americans, who represented a majority of the agricultural labor force. Many black 
workers decided to join the ongoing Great Migration and left for the more industrialized 
northern cities (Giesen, 2009). To make matters worse, the Great Depression began in the 
1930s, and pushed the already struggling rural economy of Mississippi to the brink.  
To respond to these desperate times, Governor Hugh White created the Balance 
Agriculture with Industry program in 1936. This created the first economic agency used 
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by the state, with the formal title of the Mississippi Industrial Commission. The program 
was the first independent economic agency created in Mississippi, led by three appointees 
supervised by the Governor, and had the power to issue bonds to fund local businesses. 
Among these first subsidized projects were a shipyard, a rubber factory, and a shirt 
company (“About Us: Milestones,” 2018).   
Emerging from the Great Depression into World War II, Mississippi found itself in 
better shape. Alphabet soup organizations such as the War Manpower Commission 
(WMC) helped to cover capital investments in heavy agricultural machinery. The 
establishment of huge military encampments like Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, 
necessitated large improvements to infrastructure. World War II saw the end of the utter 
dominance agriculture once held over Mississippi, tripled wages, and the permanent 
establishment of industrial, service, and professional sectors in the local economy 
(Farrell, 2001).  
Mississippi still struggles with the same stagnation it has experienced for much of 
its post-Civil War history. The state ranked last in per capita income in 2016 at $35,484, 
but enjoyed the lowest cost of living in America. The metropolitan statistical areas, with 
at least a population of 50,000, are dispersed across the state. The largest of these is the 
centrally located capital of Jackson. The Memphis metropolitan area in the northwest 
corner, along with the southern cities of Gulfport and Hattiesburg round out the most 
populous areas of Mississippi. (BLS, 2016) In 2016, the population was 2,985,000 people 
and included the highest unemployment rate of any state in January with 6.7 percent 
while the national average sat at 4.9 percent (Covered Employment, 2016). 
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Today, the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) established in the capital, 
Jackson claims to be a direct extension of the original MIC, and therefore was founded in 
1936. The MDA’s mission is to “foster a strong state economy and vibrant communities 
through innovation, use of talent and resources to improve our citizens’ lives (“About 
US,” 2018).” The establishment of the Mississippi Film Office in 1973 by Governor Bill 
Waller is likewise counted as a milestone. At the time of its founding, only four other 
film commissions like it existed.  
Like its forebears, the MDA uses the familiar tools of all governments looking to 
expand industry: local amenities and subsidies. While the operation began humbly in the 
wake of the Second World War, the current Development Authority includes 17 divisions 
with specific operational purposes, a team of eight executives, and 12 managers 
overseeing all functional divisions. New divisions include a Tourism Office, an 
Entrepreneur Center, and Community Services.   
Beginning in 2013, the MDA has published yearly public reports that detail their most 
important incentive programs. In these reports, they offer information on the year of the 
given award, the total amount that was spent, and which county received them. To 
construct an estimation of the effects of these awards, I use annual county level wage and 
employment data from 1990 to 2016. To examine this relationship I use Jordá’s (2005) 
local projection method to approximate impulse response functions for wage and 
employment figures for changes in subsidies given. To account for endogeneity, I control 
for spillover effects across contiguous counties, and county fixed effects. I find no 
significant results indicating these subsidies affect either wage or employment throughout 
the state.  
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2. Literature Review 
The literature on subsidy policies is diverse and often met with contradicting 
observations on how they affect employment, income, and production. To better 
understand these implications, I review studies covering tax credit programs in both 
Arkansas and Wisconsin, public funding for sports stadiums, credit subsidies for 
entrepreneurs, and a case study of the Nissan plant in Madison County, in the heart of 
Mississippi itself. In addition, I also review economic literature estimating multiplier 
effects. I review research about political motivations that may explain subsidy programs 
and thus influence which firms receive awards.  
Bundrick and Snyder (2017) identify common firm behavior in response to state tax 
incentives in Arkansas using an OLS regression analysis. In their analysis, they find no 
significant relationship of the program on county level employment. The target of the 
paper is the “Quick Action Closing Fund,” which they cite as encouraging rent-seeking 
behavior and negative spillover effects due to increased costs on infrastructure, 
congestion externalities, increased tax liabilities, and job transfers due to the program. 
The evidence suggests that firms would have expanded operations regardless of whether 
or not they actually receive them. Furthermore, subsidy awards with “clawback” 
agreements to recoup upfront payments expose taxpayers to risks of moral hazards and 
ineffective financial enforcement policies.  
Williams (2017) observed positive employment growth after Wisconsin adopted the 
Manufacturing and Agriculture Credit, which gave tax breaks for those specific 
industries. In his analysis, Williams finds positive spill-overs for employment across the 
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county level. However, a comparison to contiguous border counties in Michigan, 
Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois suggests that state level differences including urban 
concentration and growth, labor force dynamics, and demographics played an integral 
part in the program’s success.    
 Coates and Humphreys (2008) summarize related examples of subsidized sport 
stadiums which find little to no measurable effect on local economic output. The list of 
more than twenty separate studies centers on understanding this consensus. Different 
econometric approaches are used to measure potential changes in employment, income, 
and benefits rendered from constructing stadiums, establishing franchises, and hosting 
large events on state and local areas. No pattern of significance was found to last long 
enough to claim a long-term economic benefit. Baade and Sanderson (1997) examined 
separate regressions on employment from ten cities from 1958 to 1993 and found no 
consistent positive results. In fact, when a stadium yielded positive significance, it was at 
the expense of local employment in another area of the city, implying a transfer of 
workers had occurred.   
In regards to large scale hosting events, Hotchkiss, Moore, and Zobay (2003) 
examined employment and wage data before and after the 1996 Summer Olympics 
hosted in Georgia, using a standard difference-in-differences technique. They found no 
significant effects on wages although depending on what period they began their 
comparison, positive employment effects are observed. These results are most significant 
following the announcement of the games in 1994. It is not clear whether not the created 
jobs were short-term.  
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Coates and Humphreys (1999) examined the growth rate of per capita income for 37 
metropolitan areas with a professional sports team from the NBA, MLB, and NFL from 
1967 to 1994. Coates and Humphreys use a reduced form empirical model with a vector 
of variables to approximate the local economy. Scaling is used to account for time and 
location effects. The researchers observed that some sports franchises actually had 
negative effects on income for the local areas.  
Another common problem addressed in subsidy literature is the promotional efforts of 
sponsors, private or governmental, that tout the economic benefits of stadium 
construction over an actual cost-benefit analysis. In fact, the literature suggests that 
sponsors of these projects typically report only positive outcomes and do not include 
potential negative effects (Farren, 2017). These publications also implicitly assume that 
labor allocated to each project corresponds to the most efficient placement of resources 
possible (Noll, and Zimbalist, 1997).  
Atunes (2014) finds that financial incentives are unlikely to create a significant effect 
on productivity and may result in a negative effect on wages. A general equilibrium 
model simulating a credit market with heterogeneous agents, along with endogenous firm 
sizes and employment found a transfer from workers to entrepreneurs. The researchers 
establish a counterfactual analysis using Brazil to contrast America, and posit that 
developing countries will experience more of an observable effect through the use of 
credit subsidies than already developed countries.  
A taxpayer analysis of Madison County’s Nissan plant provided by “Good Jobs First” 
reports an overall loss on investment for the local area. Contrary to political promises of 
only $295 million for the initial investment, the State of Mississippi spent a total of $1.3 
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billion at the state and county level in order to maintain infrastructure, establish jobs, and 
give tax breaks to the car manufacturer. As of the report in 2013, an average job at the 
plant cost $290,000 with twenty percent of the workforce being temporary employees.  
Literature on fiscal multipliers from government spending is another source of 
contentious policy debate on government spending and subsidies. Traditionally, 
proponents of fiscal multipliers argue that a dollar spent by the U.S. Government will 
cause a change in output greater than one dollar. Battini et al., (2014) review that 
estimating the short-term effects of public spending is difficult, largely due to problems 
with isolating fiscal policy shocks on output. Notably, causality may be difficult to 
determine as there are often two-way relationships between the inputs and outputs that 
complicate direct measurements of an effect. They cite research implying that federal 
spending in America over the course of one year is estimated to carry a multiplier effect 
of 0.8.   
Mittnik and Semmler (2012) analyze large fiscal spending during the 2007-2008 
Obama administration stimulus package. They argue that the timing of demand shocks 
dictates the variability of a fiscal multiplier. Their model uses two regimes: one where 
economic output is low and one where it is high. This multiple-regime vector auto 
regression approach estimates the government multiplier is dependent on the business 
cycle itself, therefore accounting for the variability of multipliers in previous economic 
literature.  
Serrato and Wingender (2016) find a local income multiplier between 1.7 and 2 based 
on federal spending following population changes recorded by the Census every ten 
years. They report that any created jobs cost $30,000 each. In their treatment-and-effect 
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framework and IV approach, they find no significant spill-over effects. Low growth areas 
around the country are found to be the most affected by the treatment from federal 
spending.  
The political aspect of government is also important in understanding why firms are 
awarded subsidies. Buts et al. (2012) empirically estimate a positive relationship between 
government subsidy awards and incumbent parties winning Flemish re-elections. Using 
an OLS regression approach, per capita subsidy data and subsidy awards with local 
election data, the researchers find strong evidence that voters tend to reward politicians 
who give awards to firms.  
This relationship is explored by Cerda and Vergara (2008). They find that incumbent 
politicians who increase the number of subsidy recipients receive higher votes in 
reelections. They determine this by using panel data from three presidential elections 
from1989 to 1999 in Chile using a fixed effects model. They account for endogeneity 
presented by incumbent politicians through an instrumental variable approach. They 
observe the amount subsidies for disabled individuals and children younger than 15 as 
exogenous to garner more voters. Their analysis concludes that an incumbent politician 
seeking reelection who increases the fraction population receiving subsidies between 0.7 
and 0.8 percentage points will see an increase of 1% in their electoral performance.  
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3. Subsidies  
Continuing its legacy as heir apparent of the Mississippi Industrial Commission, the 
Mississippi Development Authority has compiled a significant list of incentives to lure in 
potential businesses. To begin, Mississippi takes a hands off approach to business. The 
top corporate tax rate was 5 percent in 2016 (Kaeding, 2016). Organized labor is rare, 
with right-to-work statutes passed in 1954 and a constitutional amendment adopted in 
1960 made it difficult for unions to form (NCSL, 2018). Finally, the Tort Reform Act of 
2004 capped the total amount of damages a defendant may be liable for depending on net 
worth. With the major aspects of the legal environment accounted for, the other carrot 
dangling from the stick may come into focus: subsidies.  
The annual publication titled “Mississippi Incentive Reports,” allows the MDA to 
account for 13 subsidy programs that cover a broad range of policy objectives. Grants 
and loans target specific industries including, forestry, manufacturing, and health care. 
Table A-1 lists levels of employment in these industries since 2010. Before diving into 
analysis, a relatively constant increase in employment is observed over the selected years.   
The reports may be found publicly through the Mississippi State Government website for 
transparency, and begin in 2013.  
Some awards are granted on different standards to encourage rural areas to develop 
infrastructure. All 82 counties are ranked annually by the Mississippi Department of 
Revenue (MDR) and divided into three distinct tiers. Tier 1 includes “developed areas;” 
Tier 2 includes “moderately developed areas;” and Tier 3 includes “less developed 
areas.” These tiers are created according to contributed tax revenue. The counties in each 
tier are listed in Table 1.    
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Foremost among these awards is the “Mississippi Major Economic Impact Act” 
(MMEIA) found under §57-75-1 of the Mississippi Code. This award is exclusively used 
to attract specific firms in targeted industries, with large investments of at least 
$300,000,000 by the firm. These industries include mining, distribution, transportation, 
processing, tourism, and federal projects; however, most recipients are involved in 
manufacturing. This legislation is typically introduced by the Governor. Employers may 
also apply if they meet a $150 million capital investment threshold from private or 
federal funding in combination with the creation of “1000 net new jobs,” or alternatively, 
with the creation of 1000 net new jobs that pay “125% of the annual wage rate of the 
state,” according to §57-75-5 of Mississippi Code. This program has spent $16 million 
per business since 2008 and a total of $113,000,000 in that same time.  
These businesses typically make headlines throughout the state when they open for 
this first time with local politicians, the Governor, or civic leaders seen cutting ribbons 
and giving speeches in commencement. In 2015, Yokohama Tire Company opened the 
doors to a new $300 million plant in West Point, MS with Governor Phil Bryant in 
attendance. Continental Tires, another winner, announced an initial investment of $1.45 
billion for its plant in Clinton.    
The “Mississippi Industry Incentive Revolving Financial Fund,” was established in 
2010 under Mississippi Code §57-1-221 to speed up the renewal process for previous 
award winners through the State Treasury. The explicit purpose of this award prepares 
“cities or counties or businesses for site preparation, infrastructure improvements, 
building construction costs, [and] training or to relocate equipment” (“Incentive Report” 
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2016). To qualify, firms must pledge to create “250 new, full-time jobs” with a total 
capital investment of at least $30 million in Tier 1 or Tier 2 counties.   
Under the same program, firms may qualify for a $15 million award by creating 150 
new, full-time jobs in federally designated low-income census tracts, by creating 1,000 
new, full-time jobs. The Census Bureau defines census tracts as “small, relatively 
permanent statistical subdivisions of a county,” that incorporate populations of no more 
than 8,000 people and are updated after each recorded census.  This legislation also 
specifically targets kitchen appliance manufacturers, with at least 400 employees and an 
investment of $5 million. An average of $12,300,000 is given per award, with spending 
totaling $308,000,000 since its inception. The Revolving Fund awards have gone to 17 
different counties across the state, clustering near Jackson with Madison and Rankin, as 
well as in the north where Lafayette, Yalobusha, and Desoto have all collected awards.   
The “ACE Fund,” was established in 2000 under Mississippi code §57-1-16 and is 
designed to close large deals with firms that have competitive offers from other states. 
This fund typically covers “relocation of equipment, specialized training, and leasehold 
or building improvements” (“Incentive Report,” 2016). Of the 97 incentives awarded, the 
average amount spent totals to $713,927 with a total of $69,300,000 given. It is common 
for one county to receive multiple grants; Lee has the most with 11, Desoto with nine, 
and Lowndes with 7 since 2009. This incentive doesn’t target specific industries, so 
businesses like Posturecraft Mattress Company in Plantersville and AmerisourceBergen 
Corporation, a pharmaceutical wholesaler in Olive Branch, compete for similar awards.   
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TABLE 1: County Revenue Rankings 
Tier	Three	 Tier	Two	 Tier	One	
Less	Developed	Areas		 Moderately	Developed	Areas	 Developed	Areas	
Holmes	 Marshall	 Adams	
Wilkinson	 Tishomingo	 Clarke	
Sunflower	 Clay	 Pearl	River	
Benton			 Franklin	 Newton	
Claiborne	 Stone	 Union	
Walthall	 Washington	 Itawamba	
Greene	 Amite	 Jackson	
Yazoo	 Choctaw	 Smith	
Perry	 Montgomery		 Grenada	
Attalla		 Wayne	 Lincoln	
Jefferson	 Copiah	 Lowndes	
Quitman	 Tunica	 Lauderdale	
Jefferson	Davis	 Calhoun		 Covington	
Kemper	 Tallahatchie		 Hancock	
Panola		 Issaquena		 Forrest	
Winston	 Pontotoc	 Waren	
Webster	 Marion	 Harrison	
Chickasaw	 Carroll	 Lamar	
Leake	 Yalobusha	 Simpson	
Noxubee	 Alcorn	 Lee	
Pike	 Scott	 Lafayette	
Monroe	 Jasper	 Jones	
Humphreys	 Lawrence	 Hinds	
Leflore	 Oktibbeha		 Neshoba	
Tippah	 Tate	 Desoto	
George	 Sharkey	 Madison	
Coahoma	 Bolivar	 Rankin	
Prentiss	     
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The “Mississippi Job Protection Act” established under Mississippi Code §57-95-
1 encourages industries that have lost jobs due to outsourcing. Once applied for and 
accepted, firms generally must match the grant dollar for dollar for a maximum amount 
of $200,000. Examples of eligible businesses that qualify for this grant include 
construction, manufacturing, telecommunication firms, and research facilities. Any firm 
taking this grant may not reduce employment by more than 20 percent. Additionally, the 
grant itself cannot exceed half of the cost of the project.   
The “Development Infrastructure Grant Program” (DIP) established under 
Mississippi Code §57-61-36 allows for a maximum of $150,000 per infrastructure 
expansion project. Municipalities and counties apply for this award on behalf of 
industries that require improvements to buildings, water utilities, sewage, transportation, 
and energy facilities. It is common for counties to receive multiple awards during one 
year for different projects. Firms which receive this grant are typically involved in 
manufacturing, energy, or medical work.   
The “Economic Development Highway Grant Program” was also established 
under Mississippi Code §57-61-36 and targets job creation and private investment 
through constructing and improving highways. Like the DIP award, this grant is 
accessible through applications by local governments on behalf of firms who make 
commitments of at least $70 million in private investment, according to the MDA.  
The “Rural Impact Fund Grant Program” (RIF) established under Mississippi 
Code §57-85-1 targets rural communities with less than 10,000 residents, or a county 
containing less than 30,000 residents. Grants are typically awarded for improvements to 
local infrastructure and land improvements for the specific purpose of expanding 
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industries involving warehousing, manufacturing, and distributing in the area. The 
maximum grant amount per project is capped at $150,000. This award does not have any 
private investment requirement. Since 2009, the allotted awards have totaled almost $9 
million. 
The “Existing Industry Productivity Loan Program” under Mississippi Code §57-
93-1 offers firms established in Mississippi for at least two years the opportunity to apply 
for loan funds for long-term fixed assets. These fixed assets are supposed to improve 
productivity and increase efficiency in business operations. This incentive may also be 
used to refinance existing loans for fixed assets. Firms which take this loan may not 
reduce employment by 20 percent. Since 2009, there have been 20 loans given from this 
program with an average of $2,570,900 per project and a total of $48,800,000 spent. 
Industries targeted by this incentive include forestry, manufacturing, and food processing.   
The “Workforce Training Fund” codified under Mississippi Code §57-1-401 
grants funding for community colleges, universities, or Mississippi firms for expenses 
incurred in training employees that do not qualify for other Federal training programs. 
This award has expanded since 2011 to account for 56 different counties across the State, 
with a total amount of $5,288,204 spent overall.  
Perhaps one of the most frequently used incentives in Mississippi, “The 
Community Development Block Grant” (CDBG) Economic Development Program 
provides public funding for counties on behalf of firms to address infrastructure 
development. This award is disbursed through the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Development with the explicit goal of producing jobs. Firms are allowed a grant of 
$20,000 per job or a maximum award of $2,500,000 per project. This award more so than 
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others traverses the typical industries awarded subsidies like manufacturing, 
warehousing, and transportation. In fact since 2009, grants have also notably been 
disbursed to detention centers, food processing services, energy companies, and forestry 
businesses. As reported by the MDA, a total of $72,500,000 has been awarded to 67 
counties, many receiving multiple awards in that same time.  
     The “Mississippi Tourism Rebate Program” provides rebates to projects 
related to tourism in Mississippi. This rebate offers 80 percent of the possible sales tax 
revenue for 15 years or until the firm has reclaimed 30 percent of the total project cost. 
These awards are concentrated mainly around the Jackson Metropolitan area, specifically 
Hinds, Madison, and Rankin counties as well as the Mississippi Gulf Coast county of 
Harrison. Museums, stadiums, hotels, and shopping outlets have all accepted a total of 
$34,100,000 in rebates.  
The “Motion Picture Rebate Program” provides rebates on payroll, sales tax, 
rental costs and other “eligible expenditures” for motion pictures, television programs, 
documentaries, commercials, animations. The listed productions may receive rebates of 
25 percent for its local investment in Mississippi, as well as a possible 30 percent rebate 
on payroll for Mississippi residents of up to $5 million. Due to the accounting methods 
used by the MDA and the production studios, it is unclear where select commercials, 
films, and other productions were shot or produced in Mississippi. Since 2009, the film 
rebate program has awarded $11,100,000. There are 20 projects without an identifiable 
filming location, totaling $2,208,063.94. The year, project name, and incentives paid for 
these projects are presented in Table 2.  
 
16 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Unknown Film Rebate Projects 
Project Year Incentive Paid 
Crestor Project  2009 $4,605.15  
I Am That Man  2010 $125,445.00  
Cheat Day Diaries  2010 $33,067.00  
Bruce's Food Commercial  2010 $31,175.35  
Call Out Documentary  2011 $13,959.32  
Big Bad...  2011 $323,103.21  
Primos Commerical Campaign  2011 $42,335.00  
Haunted  2012 $333,487.00  
Sqwincher Freezer-Pop Campaign  2012 $29,775.00 
Carnivore  2013 $16,375.00  
The Sound and the Fury 2014 $246,057.76  
Five Men Live! 2015 $44,773.18  
Battlecreek 2015 $309,493.93  
Local News  2015 $56,226.26  
Preacher Man  2015 $14,629.00  
Mississippi Grind 2015 $19,805.90  
Farm Bureau Insurance Commercial – Favre Rates 2015 $47,758.00  
Gold Tip  2016 $247,348.47  
The Neighbor 2016 $247,348.47  
St. Joe High Giant Killers 2016 $21,295.94  
Total 
 
$2,208,063.94  
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The final major reported incentive is the “Mississippi Investment Tax Credits 
Program.” This award is eligible for Community Development Entities (CDEs) in low 
census tract areas and act as state tax credits, and allows for as much as 24% of the 
Qualified Equity Investment as dictated by the Internal Revenue Service and Mississippi 
legislation. In addition, firms may also use the Federal New Markets Tax Program 
(NMTC). A total of 20 counties, most receiving more than one tax credit award, have 
been recorded by the MDA. There are seven unexplained entries titled “Various Projects” 
totaling nearly $8.5 million in credits reported between the 2009 to 2016 fiscal years.  
 In total, the MDA awarded $849,000,000 in grants, loans, and tax rebates. Of the 
approximately 2,500 awards given, Mississippi counties on average received $353,100 
per project across all observed years. Firms that frequently win these awards tend to be 
near larger urban areas. For example, Madison, Hinds, and Rankin County surround 
Jackson. The city of Olive Branch in Desoto County falls inside the Memphis 
Metropolitan Area. Pontotoc county and Lee county both received numerous awards and 
are situated near the city of Tupelo. Immediately to the south, “The Golden Triangle” 
made by West Point, Starkville, and Columbus, MS reflect another popular destination 
for manufacturing firms to invest in. The Mississippi Gulf Coast includes Jackson 
County, Hancock County, and Harrison County, with the cities of Gulfport and Biloxi 
drawing tourism for their natural beaches and new casinos. Table 4 presents a list of all 
grant programs in the reported fiscal period for the state. 
 
TA
B
LE 3: G
rant Program
s 2010-2016 
18 
 
 
  
G
rants 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
C
D
B
G
 
Econom
ic 
D
evelopm
ent 
(Federal) 
$14,731,026  
$8,147,717  
$9,844,941  
$15,592,623  
$11,073,988  
$9,379,103  
$4,809,798  
C
D
B
G
 
Public 
Facilities 
(Federal) 
$25,259,661  
$18,631,871  
$26,661,117  
$21,050,608  
$16,364,094  
$14,788,718  
$15,005,982  
Econom
ic 
D
evelopm
ent 
H
ighw
ay 
$1,466,725  
$6,250,000  
$3,300,000  
$2,500,000  
$1,200,000  
$11,700,000  
$1,200,000  
R
ural Im
pact 
Fund 
$2,045,326  
$1,631,028  
$1,490,950  
$600,000  
$1,273,614  
$1,700,000  
$150,000  
Sm
all 
M
unicipal &
 
Lim
ited 
Population 
$5,859,421  
$1,280,607  
1,963,127 
$250,000  
$4,740,000  
$1,490,000  
$3,857,727  
A
C
E Fund 
$7,051,320  
$9,220,000  
$11,531,500  
$3,895,000  
$6,740,736  
$14,468,728  
$17,023,637  
H
O
M
E 
Investm
ent 
$11,003,162  
$16,611,444  
$12,906,575  
$12,694,343  
0 
0 
0 
Job 
Protection 
$900,000  
$2,009,250  
$1,925,000  
$620,000  
$1,429,874  
$400,000  
$400,000  
D
evelopm
ent 
Infrastructure 
$4,872,934  
$4,181,499  
$5,196,710  
$5,849,492  
$5,590,654  
$6,016,306  
$2,977,436  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Total 
$73,189,575  
$67,963,416  
$74,819,920  
$63,052,066  
$48,412,960  
$59,942,855  
$45,424,580  
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4. Methodology 
I estimate impulse response functions using the local projection method proposed by 
Jordà (2005) to estimate the effects of the subsidies described in the previous section on 
county-level labor market variables. This method allows for a simple least squares 
estimation, with a robustness to misspecification for multivariate data as each sequential 
regression uses projections “local to each forecast horizon” (Jordà, 2005). A matrix 
incorporating distance weights using latitude and longitude data is used to construct 
weighted averages for neighboring counties for potential neighboring spillover effects 
(Williams, 2017). I utilize a five period forecasting horizon, where each period 
corresponds to an entire year, to predict the dynamic effects in this regression analysis.  
                   𝑦!"!! = 𝛼° + 𝛽!𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑦!"!! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!"#!! + 𝛽!𝐷!"!! +  𝜖!  
      This model assumes that subsidies given by the State of Mississippi are exogenous 
and 𝑦!" accounts for one of the two coefficients of interest: either wage or employment. I 
estimate ℎ regressions in the model forecast. The constant term is 𝛼°, while 𝛽! 
corresponds to the coefficient of the total subsidy value and represents the coefficient of 
interest. Let 𝛽! represent the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The lagged 
coefficient of average surrounding county observations is 𝛽! as part of the geographic 
matrix to include for spillover effects. These coefficients estimate the magnitude of 
neighboring county wages and employment among the private and public sectors. A total 
of four dependent variables are used in these regressions which include: total wage, 
private wage, total employment, and private employment.  
There are several advantages to using a local projection method instead of vector 
auto regressions (VARs). The model used is simple and robust to misspecification. The 
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impulse response functions reveal an estimate of the dynamic path of real changes in 
wage and employment to changes in subsidies awarded in any given period. As the lead 
of the dependent variable increases, it is less likely that confounding factors affect the 
forecast. Vector auto regressions often experience problems that impulse response 
functions can account for. Issues of symmetry for VARs often mean the response of a 
variable is the same shape regardless of whether the observed shock is positive or 
negative. The size of the treatment in VARs scales to the impulse response causing 
shape-invariance. Vector auto regressions are also history independent, meaning their 
impulse responses do not take into account previous values for observations. Finally, the 
local projection model allows me to avoid the structural issues of vector auto regressions. 
Characteristically, impulse response functions can be estimated equation-to-equation 
making them useful for panel data sets such as the one I am using to examine subsidies 
among counties.  
The addition of lagging indicators on coefficients allows for the subsequent 
regressions to account for predictable trends, therefore more accurately forecasting future 
periods to obtain the counter factual. Controls for fixed effects are added to every 
regression to reduce issues of constant unobserved heterogeneity at the county level. As a 
robustness check, a linear trend is added to the regression series. Given the already small 
effects in the original data, I then transformed the variable data into a logarithmic form to 
create elasticities that are easier to interpret. 
 
 
5. Data  
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To measure effects from subsidies, I used data from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW) presented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This data 
provides quarterly and annual wage and employment statistics at the county level. These 
observations begin in 1990 and extend until 2016. The North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) compiles data based on ownership including: federal, 
state, local, and private. I reformatted this panel data to separate private and public wage 
and employment entries. For film locations, I used the Internet Movie Database (IMDB) 
that keeps records of production locations according to cities. To account for the 
possibility of job transfers across industries targeted by subsidy policies, I use 
observations from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics. 
These records account for annual private employment at the state and national level for 
more than 800 industries.        
All subsidy information is taken from the Mississippi Development Authority’s free 
publications that began in the 2013 fiscal year. These reports are for transparency in state 
spending and list a summary of all major grant and loan programs for the last three years 
in a consistent format which includes: a brief description stating the objective for each 
program, total investment committed by companies, total incentives spent to date, as well 
as jobs committed.        
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6. Results 
6-i. Total Subsidy on Private Wage  
The first regression series observes the effect of total subsidies given on private 
wages forecasted five periods into the future. I find no significant effect in the coefficient 
of interest across all regressions. In the first forecast, 81.3 percent of the variance is 
explained according to the coefficient of determination. As zero is within the 95 percent 
confidence interval, I fail to reject the null hypothesis, and therefore do not find evidence 
of a change in private wages.  
 
FIGURE 1: Private Wage 95% Confidence Interval 
 
 
With the addition of year dummies, the coefficient of interest is still not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The lagged private wage dependent variable 
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dummies become significant following the first regression. There are seven degrees of 
freedom following the end of the forecasting horizon, suggesting limited variation in the 
results.    
 6-ii. Total Subsidy on Total Wage 
 Regressing total subsidies on total wages in Mississippi finds no significance at 
the five percent level for the parameter of interest. 80 percent of variance is explained in 
the first three forecasts by the coefficient of determination. Again, there is no significance 
as zero is within the 95 percent confidence interval. With the inclusion of dummy year 
variables, the explained variance increases to as high as 87 percent. Again, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis.    
 
FIGURE 2: All Wages 95% Confidence Interval 
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6-iii. Total Subsidy on Private Employment 
Table 6 reports the regression results for total subsidies on private employment in 
Mississippi. I find no significant effects of subsidy policies on private employment. 
Similar to the previous regression forecasts, the lagged indicator for private employment 
is significant at the 1 percent level in the first three periods. Figure 3 illustrates the 95 
percent confidence interval, which again incorporates zero. Dummy year variables offer 
insignificant changes in the tabled coefficients. Without year dummy variables during the 
fourth forecast, the R2 term explains only 30 percent of the variability between private 
employment and these subsidies.     
 
FIGURE 3: Private Employment 95% Confidence Interval 
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6-iv. Total Subsidy on Total Employment  
In the final forecasting series, I again find no significant evidence of subsidy effect on 
total employment in Mississippi. The lagged employment coefficient is a highly 
significant in the first four regression periods at the one and ten percent level, indicating 
the endogeneity present from the employment of the previous year. As the other 
regressions have indicated, I fail to reject the null hypothesis and find insignificant 
evidence of change on total employment from the subsidy coefficient. Figure 4 illustrates 
the 95 percent confidence interval plotting the response of the subsidy coefficients.  
 
FIGURE 4: Total Employment 95% Confidence Interval 
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7. Industry Estimates 
While the initial estimates plotting the dynamic path of the impulse responses of 
wages and employment for a given change in subsidies were insignificant, it may be 
possible to find evidence of employment transfers between targeted industries. I use the 
same local area method to measure potential changes and again find no significant effects 
in health care, production, transportation, agriculture, and construction. Table A-1 lists 
five of the targeted industries specifically mentioned by the MDA reports.  
7-i. Health Care Practitioners  
      Health Care Practitioners form a large industry in Mississippi, employing over 77,000 
technical professionals in 2016. It is listed in several MDA awards, including the 
“Development Infrastructure Program,” the “Rural Impact Fund” and the “Community 
Development Block Grant Program.” I fail to reject the null hypothesis using the 95 
percent confidence interval. Figure 5 plots these insignificant results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Health Care Industry 95% Confidence Interval 
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7-ii. Production 
      Production industries are often targeted by large grants, including the MMEIA and 
ACE Funds. I find only the last regression to be significant at the one percent level with 
.992 percent of the variation explained and eight degrees of freedom. Zero falls within the 
confidence interval, therefore there are no significant effects in the Production industry. 
Figure 6 shows the compiled regressions over six periods in the 95 percent confidence 
interval.  
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FIGURE 6: Production 95% Confidence Interval
 
 
 
7-iii. Transportation 
     The transportation industry is often targeted for infrastructure spending, often 
including awards from the DIP and RIF. The industry itself included more than 94,000 
workers as of 2016. The regression series finds no significant effects for this industry 
using a 95 percent confidence interval. Figure 7 lists the confidence interval for the 
transportation industry.   
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FIGURE 7: Transportation 95% Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
7-iv. Agriculture 
     The agriculture industry incorporates several professions including forestry, fishing, 
and logging. It often receives funds from the “Existing Industry Productivity Loan 
Program.” I find no significant effects of employment transfers into the agricultural 
industry following this regression series.   
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FIGURE 8: Agriculture 95% Confidence Interval 
 
7-v. Construction 
      During 2010 to 2016, the construction industry began to contract in Mississippi after 
years of stagnation. This includes professions from plumbers, roofers, setters, metal 
workers, electricians, and extractors. Employment fell to 42,000 workers from 51,000 in 
2011. I find no significant effects and therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
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FIGURE 9: Construction 95% Confidence Interval 
 
      
     My analysis fails to reveal movement of employment across industries. I find little 
evidence that subsidies directed toward targeted sectors, including agriculture, 
production, construction, and healthcare, show significant effects using the local 
projection method. I therefore find neither evidence of a net gain in jobs, nor a transfer of 
employment in my regression analysis.  
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8. Estimate of a Multiplier Effect 
I estimate a multiplier effect using the county average of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in Mississippi and the average county subsidy award in 2016. In this case, a 
multiplier effect is a change in government subsidy spending inputs, which corresponds 
to a larger change in economic output.    
The multiplier is   where y represents output and g is subsidy spending. The 
elasticity of output with respect to the subsidy is 𝐸!,! = 𝐸!,!×𝐸!,!. The elasticity of 
output is a function of government spending, written as 𝑦 𝑒 𝑔 . I estimate that 𝐸!,! = 
.01. An elasticity is defined as   . I use the following equation to plot a point estimate 
of a multiplier effect:    
 The GDP of Mississippi in 2016 was $108.5 billion (BEA, 2016). Average county 
GDP is $1,323,170,731. The average observed county subsidy in 2016 was $375,734. I 
use the fourth forecast’s private employment subsidy coefficient for 𝐸. I convert my 
results into logs for better interpretation. I estimate a point estimate of 0.18 for my 
multiplier effect. While my calculations are simple, this estimate provides additional 
evidence to the results gathered in my previous analysis which suggest that any county 
benefits in employment correspond in a reduction of economic activity in other counties.  
Politicians will likely support any spending decisions as long as the estimated 
multiplier is positive because an increase in economic output can be determined. 
However, in addition to my previous results, the estimated multiplier is very small and 
any changes that appear on wages or employment are not statistically different from zero.   
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9. Conclusion 
     Mississippi has had difficulty adapting to industrialization in the post-bellum United 
States. Politicians seized upon the political climate of the early 20th century and began to 
turn the wheel of industry in the state away from just crops. Yet natural disasters, 
rampant pests, and a diminished workforce compounded upon one another to create 
lingering problems not fully addressed until the Second World War, when federal 
government projects supplemented laborers with machines for the first time to significant 
effect. The war effort established a growing infrastructure, higher wages, skilled workers, 
and better technology. For the first time, industry could rival the cotton empire that had 
grown over centuries. The king’s long reign was ending.  
     To address pressing economic and political concerns, Governor Hugh White 
supervised the creation of the Mississippi Industrial Commission. Born in the throes of 
the Great Depression it laid the foundation for the modern day Mississippi Development 
Authority. In its current incarnation, the MDA has all the trappings of a bureaucratic 
machine. It holds significant power and discretion in the placement of infrastructure 
projects, workplace training programs, and award decisions for firms looking to open 
new locations in Mississippi.  
     The MDA pulls many levers to attract businesses. Amenities of a relaxed political 
climate, preferential of businesses, right-to-work laws, favorable tort reform towards 
corporations, and low tax rates are just the tip of the iceberg. As all state governments 
understand, businesses care as much about money as they do about how pleasant it is to 
live in an area. To convince firms who strategically perch on the fence that Mississippi 
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has exactly what they are looking for, subsidies are shown. The courtship process can be 
as formal as any first date in the South: the Governor himself may even make an 
appearance and shake hands.  
     The MDA has subsidies for every occasion. Payments for infrastructure development 
are common, as well as block buster grants for businesses with large investments to the 
order of hundreds of millions of dollars. For public accountability, the Development 
Authority has published annual incentive reports beginning in 2013 that list where the 
most important subsidy awards have gone. The aim of these reports is to not only give 
facts on what new businesses have pledged but also maintain the effectiveness of their 
awards. With every section of reports a committed investment total is strategically 
positioned, tallying expected hiring opportunities for the future as well as a government 
spending to private investment ratio. Overall, the awards tend to congregate near larger 
cities like Jackson, Hattiesburg, Gulfport, Biloxi, and Olive Branch.  
      The literature is skeptical when it comes to awarding public funds to incentivize 
private investment. Economists shrewdly point out that this is as much a political 
statement as it is a fiscal one. The prospect of new jobs must leave politicians licking 
their chops and a bottom line in dollar amount is secondary to concerns about reelection. 
Negative spillover effects can occur due to firms populating one area that can contribute 
to negative externalities like congestion, pollution, and poor infrastructure. Studies 
determine that projects which require large public investment, such as stadiums, have 
also shown negligible effects on wage and employment over large periods of time. 
Transfers of wealth from households to private entrepreneurs often result following 
subsidies. Others argue that by virtue of a government suggesting where a firm should 
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locate, the location will likely be less efficient than a business finding a location itself. 
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish programs that attempt to raise human capital 
from those that seek to influence location decisions. 
      This thesis is directed at primarily isolating an economic effect from the awarded 
subsidies of the state of Mississippi. As I find no significant effects of changes to wage 
and employment, perhaps the answer lies in the political arena, where incumbent 
politicians seeking reelection may give out more subsidies and try to redistrict themselves 
to incorporate more productive areas of the state. This area of future research could 
involve how the political process of the state factors in to the disbursement of public 
funds and lies waiting to be explored.   
      To estimate the effect of the reported subsidies, I use impulse response from Jordà’s 
(2005) local area method. This framework offers a simple model that estimates the 
dynamic path of wage and employment to changes in the subsidies reported across the 
state. It is robust to misspecification and accounts for more endogeneity with each 
successive regression. This model is used as an alternative to vector auto regressions and 
addresses problems of symmetry, shape invariance, value independence, and structural 
assumptions. I include fixed effects, lagged indicators, and dummy variables to explain 
any heterogeneity that otherwise may influence the results.  
     I find no significant effects of the $840 million spent in loans and grants on wages and 
employment in Mississippi. I look first at private wages, then all industry wages and see 
no significant results at the five percent level. The inclusion of dummy year variables 
also reveal no significance. I turn my attention to private employment and employment 
across all industries. The results are insignificant at the five percent level. I fail to reject 
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the null hypothesis using a 95 percent confidence interval. I find it unlikely that a 
multiplier effect exists given the insignificant results. Therefore, I arrive at the conclusion 
that these grants and loans have no significant impact on the creation of jobs or on wages. 
This thesis represents another entry in an expanding list of literature that finds no 
observable positive effects subsidies have for the American taxpayer.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Em
ploym
ent 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
H
ealthcare Practicioners 
71,710 
73,960 
74,920 
73,870 
75,140 
75,310 
77,970 
Production 
101,700 
101,590 
105,750 
106,160 
105,970 
106,700 
109,330 
Transportation 
88,050 
87,820 
87,470 
87,520 
89,410 
93,080 
94,320 
A
griculture 
4,450 
4,240 
3,930 
4,330 
4,640 
5,150 
4,850 
C
onstruction 
50,200 
51,320 
50,500 
50,470 
48,800 
45,160 
42,020 
Total State Em
ploym
ent 
1,070,820 
1,073,100 
1,080,420 
1,083,560 
1,094,070 
1,106,550 
1,117,280 
 
A
-1: Targeted Industry Em
ploym
ent 
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A-2: Private Industry Wages Regression 
 
 
A-3: Private Industry Wages Regression with Year Dummies 
 
 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      127.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.813           0.717           0.704           0.583           0.659           0.765   
                                                                                                                    
                           (2.91)          (3.83)          (4.80)          (6.47)          (8.36)          (8.77)   
constant                  -11.771***      -24.885***      -38.089***      -30.550***      -17.976*         -4.833   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)          (0.01)   
Year                        0.008***        0.017***        0.026***        0.022***        0.013*          0.003   
                           (0.06)          (0.07)          (0.08)          (0.11)          (0.17)          (0.32)   
L.logneighborpriva~e       -0.031          -0.074          -0.065          -0.170           0.192           0.771*  
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.002          -0.000          -0.000          -0.001          -0.000          -0.004   
                           (0.07)          (0.09)          (0.11)          (0.12)          (0.14)          (0.23)   
L.logprivatewage            0.520***        0.096          -0.356**        -0.079           0.001           0.204   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.000           0.001          -0.001          -0.000           0.000          -0.002   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                       Pvt Wage 1      Pvt Wage 2      Pvt Wage 3      Pvt Wage 4      Pvt Wage 5      Pvt Wage 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      121.000         103.000          72.000          46.000          29.000           7.000   
r2                          0.829           0.727           0.713           0.608           0.703           0.767   
                                                                                                                    
                           (0.86)          (1.09)          (1.32)          (1.41)          (2.79)          (4.65)   
constant                    5.517***       10.119***       14.780***       12.961***        6.884*         -0.195   
                           (0.02)                                                                                   
Year =2016                  0.040                                                                                   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)                                                                   
Year =2015                  0.037           0.083***                                                                
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)                                                   
Year =2014                  0.028           0.066**         0.106***                                                
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)                                   
Year =2013                  0.016           0.049*          0.080**         0.066**                                 
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)                   
Year =2012                  0.019           0.036           0.054*          0.044*          0.021                   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.01)   
Year =2011                  0.000           0.017           0.029           0.025           0.016           0.007   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.01)   
Year =2010                 -0.016          -0.011          -0.004          -0.004          -0.004           0.006   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
Year =2009                  0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000   
                           (0.06)          (0.08)          (0.09)          (0.12)          (0.22)          (0.40)   
L.logneighborpriva~e       -0.016          -0.054          -0.060          -0.154           0.336           0.821   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.002          -0.000          -0.001          -0.002          -0.002          -0.004   
                           (0.07)          (0.09)          (0.11)          (0.12)          (0.14)          (0.26)   
L.logprivatewage            0.481***        0.078          -0.364**        -0.092           0.010           0.220   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.001           0.002          -0.001           0.000           0.000          -0.002   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                       Pvt Wage 1      Pvt Wage 2      Pvt Wage 3      Pvt Wage 4      Pvt Wage 5      Pvt Wage 6   
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A-4: All Wages Regression 
 
 
A-5: All Wages Regression with Year Dummies 
 
 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      127.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.863           0.804           0.800           0.636           0.719           0.801   
                                                                                                                    
                           (2.74)          (3.44)          (3.98)          (6.99)          (9.52)         (11.08)   
constant                  -13.821***      -25.223***      -36.917***      -34.259***      -23.540*         -2.690   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)          (0.01)   
Year                        0.010***        0.018***        0.026***        0.024***        0.017*          0.001   
                           (0.06)          (0.07)          (0.08)          (0.14)          (0.23)          (0.43)   
L.logneighbortotal~e       -0.017          -0.047          -0.030          -0.159           0.131           0.960   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.001          -0.000          -0.000          -0.000           0.001          -0.003   
                           (0.07)          (0.09)          (0.10)          (0.14)          (0.16)          (0.27)   
L.logtotalwage              0.444***        0.079          -0.387***       -0.185          -0.103           0.137   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.000           0.001          -0.001           0.000           0.001          -0.002   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                     Total Wage 1    Total Wage 2    Total Wage 3    Total Wage 4    Total Wage 5    Total Wage 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      121.000         103.000          72.000          46.000          29.000           7.000   
r2                          0.871           0.810           0.804           0.642           0.729           0.807   
                                                                                                                    
                           (0.91)          (1.12)          (1.29)          (1.85)          (3.81)          (6.29)   
constant                    5.901***        9.907***       14.501***       13.716***       10.449*         -2.471   
                           (0.02)                                                                                   
Year =2016                  0.056**                                                                                 
                           (0.02)          (0.02)                                                                   
Year =2015                  0.051**         0.095***                                                                
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)                                                   
Year =2014                  0.041*          0.078***        0.122***                                                
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)                                   
Year =2013                  0.028           0.061**         0.098***        0.085***                                
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)                   
Year =2012                  0.027           0.047*          0.073***        0.066**         0.040                   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)   
Year =2011                  0.011           0.029           0.049**         0.041*          0.023           0.003   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.01)          (0.01)   
Year =2010                 -0.004           0.003           0.017           0.015           0.003           0.006   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
Year =2009                  0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000   
                           (0.06)          (0.08)          (0.09)          (0.16)          (0.30)          (0.53)   
L.logneighbortotal~e        0.005          -0.024          -0.012          -0.114           0.108           1.098   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.001          -0.000          -0.001          -0.000           0.001          -0.003   
                           (0.07)          (0.09)          (0.10)          (0.15)          (0.16)          (0.29)   
L.logtotalwage              0.425***        0.069          -0.384***       -0.206          -0.112           0.163   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.001           0.001          -0.001           0.001           0.002          -0.003   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                     Total Wage 1    Total Wage 2    Total Wage 3    Total Wage 4    Total Wage 5    Total Wage 6   
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A-6: Private Employment Regression 
 
 
A-7: Private Employment Regression with Year Dummies 
 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      127.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.720           0.538           0.365           0.301           0.341           0.435   
                                                                                                                    
                           (2.69)          (4.25)          (6.58)          (9.00)         (11.68)         (27.46)   
constant                   -8.349**       -14.423***      -20.659**       -26.803**       -26.030*         -2.273   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)          (0.01)   
Year                        0.005**         0.009***        0.014***        0.018***        0.018**         0.008   
                           (0.06)          (0.10)          (0.14)          (0.21)          (0.33)          (0.73)   
L.logneighborpriva~t       -0.052          -0.113          -0.199          -0.240          -0.484          -0.125   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.001           0.003           0.007*          0.002           0.003           0.005   
                           (0.06)          (0.09)          (0.13)          (0.16)          (0.19)          (0.37)   
L.logprivateemploy~t        0.881***        0.760***        0.436**         0.224           0.307          -0.384   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.000           0.001           0.003           0.005           0.004           0.000   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                        Pvt Emp 1       Pvt Emp 2       Pvt Emp 3       Pvt Emp 4       Pvt Emp 5       Pvt Emp 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      121.000         103.000          72.000          46.000          29.000           7.000   
r2                          0.726           0.544           0.377           0.327           0.395           0.551   
                                                                                                                    
                           (0.84)          (1.29)          (1.77)          (2.21)          (3.06)          (9.54)   
constant                    1.476           3.167*          7.457***       10.099***       12.047***       24.815*  
                           (0.03)                                                                                   
Year =2016                  0.038                                                                                   
                           (0.03)          (0.04)                                                                   
Year =2015                  0.037           0.065                                                                   
                           (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.05)                                                   
Year =2014                  0.026           0.055           0.039                                                   
                           (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.05)          (0.04)                                   
Year =2013                  0.016           0.043           0.025           0.019                                   
                           (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.05)          (0.04)          (0.04)                   
Year =2012                  0.021           0.031           0.005           0.000           0.005                   
                           (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.05)          (0.04)          (0.04)          (0.08)   
Year =2011                  0.014           0.034          -0.012          -0.021          -0.013          -0.084   
                           (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.05)          (0.05)          (0.04)          (0.08)   
Year =2010                  0.012           0.017          -0.011          -0.041          -0.042          -0.099   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
Year =2009                  0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000   
                           (0.07)          (0.10)          (0.15)          (0.23)          (0.34)          (1.28)   
L.logneighborpriva~t       -0.046          -0.106          -0.234          -0.292          -0.584          -1.574   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.001           0.002           0.007*          0.002           0.003           0.005   
                           (0.07)          (0.10)          (0.14)          (0.17)          (0.19)          (0.39)   
L.logprivateemploy~t        0.883***        0.755***        0.409**         0.178           0.240          -0.168   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.001           0.001           0.003           0.006           0.006           0.008   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                        Pvt Emp 1       Pvt Emp 2       Pvt Emp 3       Pvt Emp 4       Pvt Emp 5       Pvt Emp 6   
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A-8: Total Employment Regression 
 
 
 
 
A-9: Total Employment Regression with Dummies 
 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      127.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.765           0.610           0.445           0.371           0.345           0.338   
                                                                                                                    
                           (2.01)          (3.19)          (5.00)          (6.93)          (9.88)         (25.94)   
constant                   -6.688**       -11.368***      -14.912**       -21.124**       -21.958*         -0.580   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)   
Year                        0.004**         0.007***        0.010***        0.014***        0.015**         0.007   
                           (0.06)          (0.10)          (0.14)          (0.21)          (0.32)          (0.75)   
L.logneighbortotal~t       -0.031          -0.068          -0.175          -0.226          -0.300          -0.187   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.001           0.003           0.005*          0.002           0.002           0.004   
                           (0.06)          (0.08)          (0.12)          (0.16)          (0.20)          (0.40)   
L.logtotalemployment        0.962***        0.874***        0.659***        0.448**         0.361          -0.239   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.000           0.001           0.003           0.004           0.003           0.000   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                      Total Emp 1     Total Emp 2     Total Emp 3     Total Emp 4     Total Emp 5     Total Emp 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      121.000         103.000          72.000          46.000          29.000           7.000   
r2                          0.770           0.615           0.454           0.395           0.405           0.445   
                                                                                                                    
                           (0.77)          (1.21)          (1.74)          (2.19)          (3.11)         (12.26)   
constant                    0.566           1.805           5.198**         7.899***       10.019**        25.774   
                           (0.02)                                                                                   
Year =2016                  0.023                                                                                   
                           (0.02)          (0.03)                                                                   
Year =2015                  0.022           0.042                                                                   
                           (0.02)          (0.03)          (0.04)                                                   
Year =2014                  0.013           0.032           0.025                                                   
                           (0.02)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.03)                                   
Year =2013                  0.006           0.023           0.015           0.015                                   
                           (0.02)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.03)          (0.03)                   
Year =2012                  0.011           0.016           0.002           0.002           0.005                   
                           (0.02)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.08)   
Year =2011                  0.004           0.018          -0.010          -0.015          -0.009          -0.073   
                           (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.08)   
Year =2010                  0.003           0.004          -0.011          -0.032          -0.034          -0.085   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
Year =2009                  0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000   
                           (0.06)          (0.10)          (0.15)          (0.23)          (0.34)          (1.51)   
L.logneighbortotal~t       -0.026          -0.060          -0.206          -0.275          -0.401          -1.726   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.001           0.002           0.005*          0.002           0.002           0.004   
                           (0.06)          (0.09)          (0.13)          (0.16)          (0.19)          (0.43)   
L.logtotalemployment        0.963***        0.864***        0.643***        0.425*          0.317          -0.050   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.001           0.001           0.003           0.005           0.005           0.007   
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                      Total Emp 1     Total Emp 2     Total Emp 3     Total Emp 4     Total Emp 5     Total Emp 6   
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A-10: Health Care Regression 
 
 
A-11: Production Industry Regression  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      126.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.746           0.625           0.728           0.802           0.825           0.988   
                                                                                                                    
                           (1.08)          (1.45)          (1.85)          (2.33)          (3.86)          (3.51)   
constant                   -6.963***       -7.205***      -12.880***      -18.817***      -33.356***      -57.310***
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
Year                        0.009***        0.009***        0.012***        0.014***        0.022***        0.033***
                           (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.06)          (0.11)          (0.09)   
L.logneighborpriva~t       -0.008          -0.031           0.042           0.067           0.129           0.409** 
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.000           0.001          -0.001           0.001          -0.003*          0.000   
                           (0.02)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.04)          (0.06)          (0.05)   
L.logprivateemploy~t        0.029           0.010           0.012           0.057          -0.027          -0.061   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal            -0.002*          0.000           0.000           0.002          -0.001          -0.002** 
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                     Health Car~1    Health Car~2    Health Car~3    Health Car~4    Health Car~5    Health Car~6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      126.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.827           0.780           0.743           0.768           0.884           0.993   
                                                                                                                    
                           (1.03)          (1.14)          (1.24)          (1.75)          (2.31)          (1.89)   
constant                  -11.706***       -9.299***       -5.169***       -8.459***      -22.210***      -36.701***
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
Year                        0.012***        0.010***        0.008***        0.010***        0.016***        0.023***
                           (0.02)          (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.06)          (0.05)   
L.logneighborpriva~t        0.008          -0.032           0.004           0.079           0.106           0.220** 
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal          -0.002**         0.001           0.001          -0.001          -0.002*          0.000   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.04)          (0.03)   
L.logprivateemploy~t       -0.017           0.007          -0.005           0.018           0.000          -0.033   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal            -0.001          -0.001           0.001           0.001          -0.001          -0.001** 
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                     Production 1    Production 2    Production 3    Production 4    Production 5    Production 6   
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A-12: Transportation Industry Regression 
 
A-13: Agriculture Industry Regression 
 
A-14: Construction Industry Regression  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      126.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.723           0.858           0.930           0.942           0.896           0.976   
                                                                                                                    
                           (1.58)          (1.43)          (1.47)          (1.93)          (3.19)          (2.92)   
constant                  -14.509***      -22.422***      -31.808***      -42.104***      -35.522***      -16.182***
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
Year                        0.013***        0.017***        0.021***        0.027***        0.024***        0.015***
                           (0.04)          (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.05)          (0.09)          (0.08)   
L.logneighborpriva~t       -0.030           0.023           0.049           0.013          -0.093          -0.340** 
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.000           0.001          -0.001*         -0.001           0.002*         -0.000   
                           (0.04)          (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.05)          (0.04)   
L.logprivateemploy~t        0.030           0.031           0.039          -0.009           0.028           0.051   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal            -0.001           0.001           0.001          -0.002**         0.001           0.002** 
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                      Transport 1     Transport 2     Transport 3     Transport 4     Transport 5     Transport 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      126.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.551           0.696           0.745           0.590           0.258           0.911   
                                                                                                                    
                           (5.94)          (6.30)          (7.31)         (11.55)         (19.83)         (17.77)   
constant                  -59.708***      -82.949***      -95.293***      -85.712***       -2.243         122.955***
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01)   
Year                        0.034***        0.044***        0.052***        0.049***        0.008          -0.049***
                           (0.14)          (0.15)          (0.16)          (0.28)          (0.56)          (0.47)   
L.logneighborpriva~t       -0.047           0.211          -0.045          -0.372          -0.742          -2.071** 
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.003          -0.003          -0.003          -0.002           0.014*         -0.000   
                           (0.14)          (0.14)          (0.15)          (0.20)          (0.32)          (0.24)   
L.logprivateemploy~t        0.014           0.024           0.039          -0.197           0.101           0.309   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.005           0.004          -0.002          -0.011*          0.008           0.012** 
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                     Agricultur~1    Agricultur~2    Agricultur~3    Agricultur~4    Agricultur~5    Agricultur~6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
df_r                      126.000         108.000          76.000          49.000          31.000           8.000   
r2                          0.752           0.869           0.924           0.963           0.994           1.000   
                                                                                                                    
                           (3.45)          (3.27)          (3.61)          (3.71)          (2.07)          (0.59)   
constant                   71.950***       92.398***      111.490***      138.244***      155.920***      155.778***
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
Year                       -0.030***       -0.040***       -0.049***       -0.062***       -0.072***       -0.072***
                           (0.08)          (0.08)          (0.08)          (0.09)          (0.06)          (0.02)   
L.logneighborpriva~t        0.062           0.001          -0.123          -0.184*         -0.068           0.069** 
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
L.logSubsidyTotal           0.002          -0.002           0.001           0.003*          0.000           0.000   
                           (0.08)          (0.07)          (0.07)          (0.07)          (0.03)          (0.01)   
L.logprivateemploy~t       -0.076          -0.080          -0.092          -0.032          -0.041          -0.010   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
logSubsidyTotal             0.003           0.000          -0.003           0.001           0.001          -0.000** 
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                     Constructi~1    Constructi~2    Constructi~3    Constructi~4    Constructi~5    Constructi~6   
                                                                                                                    
